Saturday, January 15, 2011

Connie Willis' "Blackout" and "All Clear" -- and the meaning of our lives

Connie Willis's two-volume book, Blackout and All Clear, takes us via time travel back to the Second World War and the Nazi bombings of London. It's a long book -- over 1100 pages, in two volumes, both published in 2010, that really are not two books but just separately published halves of one. But it rewards reading, for Willis' vivid portrait of a remarkable part of our actual past, and for the way she brings her weave of plot lines to its transporting conclusion.

The book is also a work of faith. Though Willis does not assert that God's hand is at work, and in fact the vehicle for the plot is time travel and the workings of the time "continuum," nevertheless the essence of the book, I feel, is that God is in the machine (here, continuum).

Yet the practical moral of the book is not that all will be well, but rather that acts of loving kindness are worth undertaking. The second volume begins by quoting Churchill: "You will make all kinds of mistakes; but as long as you are generous and true, and also fierce, you cannot hurt the world or even seriously distress her." It is worth doing the best we can, and each of us should join in the world's efforts with the hope of achieving good results. No one is an island, and no one is disqualified.

Perhaps it is surprising, perhaps it is proof that we are all part of one culture, but these lessons are very much like those David Brooks draws in an essay called "Social Animal: How the new sciences of human nature can help make sense of a life," in The New Yorker, Jan. 17, 2011. There Brooks tells an extended parable about the life we now lead, culminating in the words of a (possibly fictional) neuroscientist, who says that his studies of the brain led him to give up an image of himself "as a lone agent." Now he feels that "we inherit a great a river of knowledge, a flow of patterns coming from many sources." When we become "immersed directly in that river," we flourish. "I've come to think," says the neuroscientist, that "[h]appiness isn't really produced by conscious accomplishments. Happiness is a measure of how thickly the unconscious parts of our minds are intertwined with other people and with activities. Happiness is determined by how much information and affection flows through us covertly every day and year."

Brooks' neuroscientist also mentions that for some people this experience comes "when they feel enveloped by God's love." For Willis, the experience of God's love doesn't seem to be one of absence or contemplation. Nor is it a feeling that even believers always enjoy. I think she would say, rather, that the times when we feel this divine love sustain us during the daily struggles of life, as we make our many mistakes.

Now is that feeling illusory? A conventional secular answer, certainly consistent with the views of Brooks' neuroscientist, is that connection is real, while envelopment by God's love just a confused perception of that reality. Perhaps so. But it appears that the capacity to feel a "mystical sense of oneness" has a concrete foundation in our brain circuitry. (So Dr. Kevin Nelson, author of a recent book on "near-death experiences," explains in an interview on Salon.) Like the capacity to feel connection with particular people, the capacity to feel connection with some larger whole is part of our biological makeup.

That neither proves nor disproves the truth of these experiences, as Dr. Nelson rightly points out. Perhaps, again, the biological capacity for connection is innate, the particular transposition to religion a misperception. The turn to religion might be useful, in the same way that overconfidence seems to be useful in enabling people to move through life, but still objectively mistaken. Perhaps. But it is interesting that our brains are primed for experiences like this. We are in some ways very good at perceiving the world despite our physical limitations -- compare the feats of baseball players discerning the path of pitches which as they approach the plate are literally moving too fast to be followed. It seems at least possible that our capacity for this kind of feeling reflects that there is indeed some greater whole to be perceived.

Wednesday, January 12, 2011

"The Truth Wears Off" and evidence of E.S.P.

Jonah Lehrer in The New Yorker (Dec. 13, 2010) carefully investigates reasons why “the truth wears off” as scientific findings, vivid at one moment, gradually cease to be so demonstrable. He looks particularly to “publication bias” and “selective reporting” and “sheer randomness” as explanations. All have force, and perhaps they account for most of the problem that Lehrer examines with the aid of Professor Jonathan Schooler.
But I’m not sure they fully account for the example of Dr. Rhine’s extrasensory perception research, which the article offers as one of its striking instances of data decline. (These factors may not entirely explain Prof. Schooler’s own data problems either, but I won’t pursue that here.) It seems from Lehrer’s account that Rhine’s data collapsed – that is, the undergraduate who appeared to have phenomenal E.S.P. powers stopped producing his feats of perception – “just as he [Rhine] began to believe in the possibility of extrasensory perception.” That strongly suggests that Rhine’s earlier data weren’t biased somehow by his own belief in E.S.P. Lehrer reports that Rhine prepared papers for publication that would have reported the undergraduate’s remarkable achievements; it’s not clear from the article whether or when those were published, but at any rate no publication bias seems to have prevented Rhine himself from discerning the deterioration of the data.
It remains possible, certainly, that randomness is the real culprit – anything can happen, and it might just have been sheer randomness that this student got lucky, rather than psychic, for a time. But the problem with “randomness” is that it functions as a wild card, explaining only by declaring something inexplicable. What if, instead, the data pointed to something real and not random at all? For example, suppose that people do sometimes have psychic abilities, but not very often or very dependably. Perhaps psychic abilities burn out quickly – so that what happened to Dr. Rhine was that he observed the actual tendency of human E.S.P. to burn out (and not just in one undergraduate; Lehrer reports that the same fall-off took place “in nearly every case” where a subject initially showed E.S.P. ability).
So perhaps most instances of the truth wearing off reflect various forms of scientific error or sheer, random mystery. But if the data are measuring a phenomenon that burns out, then the data reflect, and quite straightforwardly, not error but actual reality. It seems important to keep in mind the possibility that the data aren’t wrong, while also being sensitive to the many reasons why they might be.
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Lehrer's article happened to precede by just a few days another moment of media attention to research into E.S.P., by Benedict Carey, "Journal's Article on ESP Is Expected to Prompt Outrage," New York Times, Jan. 5, 2011. Whether the article in The Journal of Personality and Social Psychology is well-founded or not I cannot say, though it's impossible not to like the idea that people can ever so slightly predict the future when it involves their viewing erotic photographs. But it is striking that at least one "longtime critic of ESP research," quoted in the Times article, felt that the publication of the study was "craziness, pure craziness. I can't believe a major journal is allowing this work in." This is, of course, a call for "publication bias." Personally, I think the psychology journal's decision to publish the piece along with a rebuttal is a much better response than refusing to publish, precisely because it opens the issues up to examination and debate in the marketplace of ideas. But I expect that in almost every field there are propositions that simply cannot be contradicted within the boundaries of the field itself. We are in favor of freedom, but not friends of error, and policing error always risks sliding into restricting freedom.

Saturday, January 1, 2011

On the absence of truly "foundational" lawyering skills

A question for 2011:

What are the foundational skills of law practice?

And a possible answer: There aren't any.

Of course, there are a lot of skills that competent lawyers need to possess and employ. Although one law job is by no means necessarily the same as the next, there are probably even some skills -- an understanding of how cases and statutes work, for example -- that almost all practicing lawyers make use of.

But I mean "foundational" in a different sense -- not what do you need to be a competent attorney, but what do you need in order to learn how to be a competent attorney. Are there some skills, in other words, which lawyers need to learn first, before they can learn other elements of the total repertoire they will ultimately need?

This is the question to which I think the answer is no. We can test the correctness of this arguably counterintuitive answer by asking ourselves whether someone could begin his or her preparation for a legal career only by studying legal doctrine. American law schools in a sense are organized as if that were so -- hence the immersion in legal doctrine in the first year. But many of our students come to law school after years of experience in jobs such as paralegal positions. What these students have done, presumably, is to begin their "preparation" by engaging in circumscribed forms of the practice of law itself -- reviewing documents, perhaps, or organizing trial files, or conducting initial interviews of potential clients. Some paralegals no doubt also get initial training in the meaning and manipulation of legal doctrine, but for those who don't, the fact is that they were able to begin their acquisition of legal expertise by studying something other than legal doctrine.

To say that no particular starting point is essential leaves many possibilities still to be explored. Perhaps some particular starting point is desirable even though not essential. Perhaps some set of skills, or some combination of knowledge and skills, needs to be assembled in the course of "preparation" -- though not necessarily right at the start of the process -- for a lawyer to develop successfully. These are issues worth close examination (look for further posts this year).

But for the reasons I've just expressed, I think it is a mistake, in considering how to structure legal education or the broader process of lawyers' "preparation," to start from the idea that there is some single foundational point that must be the rock on which everything else is later assembled.

Thursday, December 30, 2010

Post-apartheid South Africa and the post-Civil War United States

Perhaps the founding moment in US history that's most analogous to South Africa today is not the Revolution and the writing of the Constitution but the Civil War and its aftermath. The writing of the constitution was about constructing a nation, and that was certainly part of what South Africa undertook after the end of apartheid. But it was the Civil War, and the Reconstruction amendments ending slavery and barring racial discrimination, that marked the United States' effort to cleanse itself of injustice -- and that's the central theme of South Africa's transition.

What's troubling about this analogy is that the course of post-Civil War politics in the US did not run smooth. There were real efforts to remake the South, but they ran aground, and meanwhile Washington became the scene of remarkable levels of corruption (as my son Brian reminds me), perhaps partly because the spoils had grown more abundant as the war expanded the role of government, and partly because a new party and new people now had access to the treats Washington offered. My impression is that the Republican Party -- the noble party of Lincoln -- swiftly devolved to emptily "waving the bloody flag" of the Union's Civil War cause. It's possible to see South Africa today as all too similar, with grasping, mercenary politicians wrapping themselves in the slogans of liberation as they pursue their own interests. Perhaps this is one characteristic form of the decline of ideals as they become absorbed in the overwhelming practical business of ordinary politics.

But if that is so, the implications aren't all bad. The end of Civil War idealism in the United States was a deep loss, above all for the cause of racial justice which faded from view for many decades. But this was not the end of politics, or of struggle against injustice. Pride goeth before a fall, and the arrogant wealth of the Gilded Age in the late 19th Century surely contributed to the rise of unions and of modern liberalism in the United States (among other developments), and over a long sweep of time the "arc of justice" for African-Americans became prominent again as well. Perhaps South African politics too will reshape itself into new, and vibrant, movements against the inequalities left from the past and still being generated in the present. Then, happily, it will be clear that the problems of today's South Africa are not signs of looming disaster but part of the often disappointing, yet still profoundly valuable, play of democratic politics.

Sunday, December 26, 2010

Jonny Steinberg's "The Number" and the meaning of a constitution of no slogans

Jonny Steinberg's remarkable book The Number illustrates -- in virtuoso style -- the kind of sensibility that that a constitution of no slogans would rest on. His story of Magadien Wentzel, a senior member of the prison gang known as the 28s, confounds almost any expectation.

Oppression causes crime, it's often said, and rightly; but as Steinberg rightly observes, crime is a particularly conservative response to oppression. Criminals leach off of any order, and so they are not necessarily friends of the other victims of the order from which they steal. But the prison gangs had politics, anti-apartheid politics, and their hopes that their own liberation would follow from South Africa's were bitterly disappointed. All this is a useful reminder that "the oppressed" are far from a uniform mass, and that in fact among the oppressed are both victims and oppressors -- and that these two categories may often overlap, as poor people turn to crime against other poor people as their path to some degree of power and wealth.

What is more startling, however, is to learn that the Number -- actually three separate groups, the 26s, 27s and 28s -- had existed as long as South Africa had been a nation, and that their existence rested on ritual and mythology, all generated, it seems, in or near prison. Leaders of the Number had uniforms, weapons and a sacred text written on the hide of a bull -- but all of these implements existed only in their minds. They also had memories, or fantasies, of a golden age of the Number, some decades back from the tarnished present. In short, these oppressed men, who were vigorously engaged in oppressing other prisoners and carrying on a choreographed, violent-but-usually-not-lethal interaction with the guards, were also engaged in social ordering and myth-making. They were dangerous criminals, and creators of a society. And their odd form of order was itself threatened, not so much by the warders or by the end of apartheid as by the rise of drug gangs on the outside that for strategic reasons of their own appropriated the symbolism shaped by the Number.

What could a just society possibly do about the Number? What, especially, could such a society do if it was -- as South Africa was -- terrified by an explosion of crime? It is hard to see the legal framework big enough to speak meaningfully to this world.

But in fact the book is not just about the capacity of a gang society to evolve and persist, like antimatter in a universe of matter. For it is also, and above all, the story of the incompleteness of that gang society, and the life of Magadien Wentzel, who became a leader of the Number and then left it because he wanted to have a life that had meaning. That turned out to be almost as intractable a challenge for him as dealing with the Number might be for South Africa: filled with dreams of helping steer others away from crime, he found himself without money and without employment, living in isolation and dependent on the generous of people whose generosity faded.

And yet he did not, at least in the time that Steinberg's book covers, succumb. This one man, in fact, seems to have found a break -- because in the end Steinberg could not bring himself to profit from Wentzel's story while Wentzel himself was trapped in poverty, and so he signed over 10 % of the book's royalties to Wentzel himself. The book won a prize, and readers, and I hope that means that Wentzel himself has found opportunities -- and not been undercut by them. It is moving to read Wentzel's own Afterword, with which the book ends, and its last words, "May God be the judge of this book." Perhaps every book seeks the moral seriousness that would deserve a standard so profound, but certainly few books end with quite this striking a call for commitment.

And a constitution of no slogans? The judges and lawyers shaping a constitutional order of this sort would resist easy generalizations (from "poverty causes crime" to "criminals are irretrievable"). They would recognize the complexity of even a single life. They would not be blithely idealistic, but they would not give up on hope either. And they would recognize that they themselves are, inescapably, part of the story that they study and tell.

Saturday, December 25, 2010

A constitution of no slogans

A thought on Christmas Day:

Life is more complex than we might have expected. Human beings turn out not to share a uniform genetic heritage -- some of us are the product of interbreeding with Neanderthals, others (according to this week's news reports) of interbreeding with a hitherto unknown offshoot of humanity called the Denisovans. Human beings are also notoriously plastic -- our children are born knowing almost nothing, and take 20 years to achieve adult knowledge, while simpler creatures are fully equipped for their lives much more quickly, but the result is that we can adapt to far more varied and challenging circumstances than we could if we were born set in our ways. Even in adulthood we are constantly shaping the people we ourselves will become, and so we can become many things. William James said something to the effect that we should choose those beliefs that best serve our interests, and -- though the process is surely not so willful or simple as that -- we do have some ability (sometimes too ready an ability) to follow his advice.

All of which says that the sphere of fixed certainties is pretty modest. That doesn't leave us rudderless, but it suggests the need for a certain measure of restraint as we encounter the complex realities of how lives work. Just to pick up where my last post left off: how does customary law work? What are the currently governing rules of customary law? What are people's actual customs? These are questions with no simple answers, and there are likely many more such difficult questions, in the United States as in South Africa. The beginning of wisdom, I think, is to acknowledge how much we don't know, and how much may indeed never be settled, and to try to listen as hard as possible to people so that we can understand their actual needs and desires and principles as well as we can. I know that there is no listening without framework, but there are more and less open frameworks, and we need to try to be as open as we can. In that sense, though we need a constitution that protects against the real dangers of oppression and needless suffering that are part of life in society, we also need a constitution of no slogans.

Sunday, December 19, 2010

On figuring out what customary law is, especially when it's changing

(With apologies for two months of non-blogging!)

Back from a conference in Cape Town honoring Martin Chanock for his distinguished work on South African legal history, customary law and legal education, I'm realizing that the task of making customary law part of a Western-style legal system -- as South Africa's constitution envisions -- is truly complex.

If customary law were written down, of course, it would be easy to apply it in the same courts that apply common law principles, statutes, and constitutional requirements every day. But if customary law is written down, it risks becoming detached from actual custom -- as indeed happened, notoriously, as whites created a body of customary law adjudication and legislation in the 19th and 20th centuries.

So, too, if customary law were definitively pronounced by a particular person, such as the chief, or by a particular body, such as a council of elders, then its contents would be readily determinable. But if customary law truly is the law created by custom, then it is entirely possible that even if custom at one time conferred such law-pronouncing power on the chief or the council, the custom has now shifted -- and because of that shift, the chief or the council no longer actually have customary sanction for declaring what customary law is.

Or another variation: Suppose that the chief, for instance, is still empowered by custom to make rulings about the content of customary law. But custom also makes clear that the chief's task in this process is not to make the law he (or she) prefers, but to discern the law that has evolved from the customs of the community. How should the chief go about doing this? At this point the chief is in something of the same position as the Western-style judge, though the chief has the substantial advantage of actually being closely familiar with the customs of the community (and the potential disadvantage of having his/her own personal or political interests quite directly at stake): for each of them, the problem is that the customs in question may be unclear or may be in the process of changing.

If a community at one time held a custom of, say, male primogeniture in inheritance, how would someone -- its chief, or a judge of the South African High Court -- tell whether that custom still held, and still had the force of law? If most of the community no longer adhered to the custom, would it no longer have the force of law? Perhaps the answer is obviously yes (that it would no longer be law), but what if most members of the community still declared the point to be a customary rule, and tried to cover up the moments when they themselves departed from the rule? Or what if most members of the community said they weren't sure if the custom was still part of their law, while the rest of the community asserted that it definitely was? Or what if current members of the community were divided in their views, but the chief, or the judge, was convinced that one view fitted much better with the accumulated history of the group than the other view did?

I imagine there are many variations on these questions, variations that are actually arising in real South African communities, and perhaps in many other nations where customary law remains important. (There may well be analogous questions in connection with the customary law of nations -- but I won't try to pursue that issue here.) There don't seem to be any obvious solutions, least of all for judges who aren't very familiar with the customs whose actual content and legal force they are attempting to grasp. It would be convenient if the problems could simply be handed over to traditional leaders such as chiefs, but that solution is logically a circular one if the extent of the traditional leaders' authority is itself one of the controverted issues of customary law. It's also problematic to the extent that chiefs' power, even if uncontroverted in terms of tradition, is subject to constitutional challenge for its inconsistency with constitutional liberties now guaranteed to South Africans in every context of their lives.

Perhaps the best that can be said is that a society committed to honoring customary law must begin by paying very close attention to it, and to the various views of it that different members of customary communities express. A good deal of South African law constitutional law now seems to be aimed at generating that kind of close attention to the actual views of actual, previously unheard, people -- and that effort is exactly on target.