Hot off the presses: “For Martin Chanock: Essays on Law and
Society,” Volume 28, Number 2 of the Australian journal Law in Context, available here. I edited this issue, with Heinz
Klug and Penelope Andrews, and all of us were very pleased to have the chance
to help celebrate the work of Martin Chanock, a remarkable historian of African
and South African law, and someone we’ve known and liked for many years.
For those who are interested, the editors’ introduction frames
the issue and discusses the eight articles which appear in it, all of which
respond in one way or another to Martin’s wide-ranging work. We also quote the
eloquent personal tribute to Martin from Jianfu Chen, the former Head of School
at La Trobe University School of Law, where Martin is now an Emeritus
Professor; Jianfu said that Martin exemplified “decency,” and explained that
“the seemingly easy task of being a decent person demands the output of the
highest quality of human beings: honesty, integrity, passion, and compassion.”
(Page 6)
I also wrote one of the eight articles, “A Bittersweet
Heritage: Learning from The Making of
South African Legal Culture.” Martin’s book, whose full title is The Making of South African Legal Culture
1902-1936: Fear, Favour and Prejudice (2001), is (I said) a “deeply
unsettling …. argument that race was at the heart of the entire enterprise of
South African judging, not only the regrettable decisions but also the
admirable ones.” (Page 76) I am inclined to think that this argument is
correct, provided it is understood as a systemic observation rather than an
appraisal of each and every judge – since there were individual, remarkable
judges who waged legal battle against apartheid even as they held office under
it. In the article I sought first to understand how Chanock’s argument could
indeed be true, or more precisely to understand how even upright judges,
capable of decisions that helped preserve the claims of human rights through
very dark days in South Africa, were nevertheless people of their time and not
somehow disconnected from its appalling problems.
But then I asked whether it followed, if Chanock’s appraisal
was correct, that the right response today, as South Africa seeks to eliminate
the taint of racism in its law and its life, is to disestablish entirely the
institution of judging as it was practiced before the end of apartheid. My
answer to this question was and is “no.” The old system’s formalism, with its
“austere, independent judiciary, engaged in determination of outcomes through
the application of a highly rationalised and complex logical process” (page
84), certainly needs reshaping. Its elitist manner should be diminished and its
substantive reasoning made to rest on the new egalitarian liberty embodied in
the constitution – changes that the Constitution, and the Constitutional Court,
have aimed to accomplish. But the fundamental stance of judicial objectivity,
the aim of judging “without fear, favour or prejudice,” the commitment to the
idea of judges as experts on the law – all these, I urged, are both a kind of
formalism and integral to liberty, in South Africa and throughout the world.
I’ll set out here the last few lines of the piece (page 88):
If the courts are to listen, and to
help shape a country in which other government actors also listen, then perhaps
what South Africa needs is not to beware of formalism but to beware of formulas.
Let us seek a constitution of no slogans, in which courts – continuing their
historic role of providing a measure of independent judgment about society –
deepen their contribution by being as sensitive as possible to the
entitlements, and imperfections, of all who come before them.
And the other seven articles are interesting too!
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